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INTRODUCTION
American legal regimes governing water face a pivotal moment in history.
Just as water resources in this country confront unprecedented threats, states
must decide between two fundamentally opposing paths for managing their
increasingly scarce water resources in the future: privatization, whereby water is
treated as a commodity and marketed as such, or recognition of water as a
public good under the public trust doctrine. In 1892, the United States Supreme Court ruled in its seminal Illinois Central RairoadCo. v. Illhnois decision that each state holds certain natural resources in trust for its citizens and
protects these resources from the "obstruction or interference of private parties."' While water is among the resources protected by the public trust, the

* J.D. 2013, Vermont Law School; B.A. 2010, University of Puget Sound. A special
thanks to Jack Tuholske for his continued guidance on this topic.
1. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
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scope of the trust and the extent to which it limits private development remains uncertain and varies tremendously from state to state.'
Perhaps the clearest example of the clash between private and public interests in water can be seen in Hawaii, where conflicts between large land plantations and native Hawaiians over water within the state date back for centuries. In recent decades, community groups sought to restore Hawaii's water
resources by fighting legal battles against private companies whose diversions
have left many streams dry. In 2000-in one of the most important recent cases
expanding the public trust-the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that "all water
resources" within the state are subject to the public trust.' In In re Water Use
PermitApplications ("Waidhole Ditch"), native Hawaiians and local farmers
sought to restore water to streams that some of the State's most powerful private interests had diverted, including former sugar plantations whose predecessors participated in the overthrow of the Hawaiian Monarchy during the late
1800s.' Applying a broad reading of the public trust doctrine, the court vacated
in part the Hawaii Commission on Water Resource Management's ("Commission") decision on the ground that it failed to restore flows to the streams
sufficient to protect the public's rights in the waters of the streams.'
Twelve years after its celebrated decision in Waidhole Ditch, Hawaii's
highest court again confirmed that the public trust doctrine is a valuable tool
for reining in private rights in water in order to promote public purposes. As
in Wazhole Ditch, local community groups in In re 'lao Ground Water
Management Area ("Four Great Waters") sought to defend the rights of the
public in Hawaii's water resources by challenging two of the largest private
entities within the State-the Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar Company and the
Wailuku Water Company.' In its decision the court unanimously vacated the
Commission's decision granting water permit applications to the companies
and restoring little to none of the instream flows necessary to sustain four major Maui streams.'
In addition to expanding upon the jurisdictional analysis in Waidhole
Ditch, the court held that the Commission's decision setting instream flows for

2. Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctnes:
Classificationof States, PropertyRights, andState Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REv. 1,
3-5 (2007); Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States' Public Trust
Doctrines:Public Values, PrivateRights, andthe Evolution Toward an EcologicalPublic Trust,
37 EcOLOGY L.Q. 53, 55-57 (2010).
3. Jack Tuholske, Trusting the Public Trust Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to
GroundwaterResources, 9 VT.J. ENvL. L. 189, 219 (2008).
4. hi re Water Use Permit Applications ( Waidhole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409 , 484-85 (Haw.
2000).
5. Isaac Moriwake, Water as a "PublicTrust" in HawaiY: Public-InterestEnvironmentalism and Native Hawaiian Rights (2012) abstract available at http://citation.allacade
mic.com/meta/pmla-apa-research citation/4/1/7/9/3/
p417935_index.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2013).
6. Wadhole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 501.
7. In re 'lao Ground Water Mgmt. Area High-Level Source Water Use Permit Applications (FourGreat Waters), 287 P.3d 129, 132 (Haw. 2012).
8. Id. at 132-33.
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the Na Wai 'Eha water system failed to comply with the public trust in several
respects.' First, the court found that the Commission failed to properly consider the rights of Native Hawaiians and the impact of its amended instream flows
on "traditional and customary native Hawaiian practices."" In addition, it held
that the Commission's analysis of instream uses was incomplete because it
failed to "fully consider" all instream uses, which the Commission must weigh
against noninstream uses before setting instream flow standards." Finally, the
court concluded that the Commission violated the public trust doctrine by
failing to adequately pursue alternatives to diverting Na Wai 'Eha water, such
as using recycled wastewater and other sources that would allow more water to
remain in the streams." Reversing the Commission's decision, the court explained that "[w]here the Commission's decision-making does not display a
level of openness, diligence, and foresight commensurate with the high priority
these [public trust] rights command under the laws of our state, the decision
cannot stand.""
The Four Great Waters decision is a significant. expansion of public trust
principles and confirms that Hawaii is a leader among states in protecting public rights in water. Part I of this Article discusses the unique historical development of water resources in Hawaii. Part II dissects the Four Great Waters
decision, separately addressing each of the court's holdings pertaining to the
public trust. The Article addresses the impact of the decision on the evolving
notion of the public trust in Part III and argues that the Four Great Waters
decision expands public trust principles by advocating for a more active role
for the courts in reviewing decisions involving trust resources. Specifically, it
focuses on the court's exercise of jurisdiction and suggests that-by emphasizing the importance of judicial review of actions impacting trust resources-the
decision promotes public participation in public trust decision-making. Finally,
the Article discusses the heightened standard of review the court applies in
decisions involving the state water resources trust. These developments solidify
the public trust doctrine's concrete ability to protect public interests in water
by applying a precautionary. approach to the protection of public trust resources.
I. BACKGROUND: HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF WATER
RIGHTS IN HAWAII
Although water law regimes differ from state-to-state, the system of water
rights in Hawaii is particularly unique. For the most part, the Hawaiian system
of water rights does not resemble the riparian or prior appropriation system to
which most states adhere." Instead, "[it is the crystallization into legal form of
9.
I.at 152.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 133.
12. Id. at 163.
13. Id. (internal citation and quotations omitted).
14. 2 WELLS A. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAws IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES
173 (2004); Maivan Clech Lam, The Kuleana Act Revisited: The Surivalof TradidonalHadai-
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customs of ancient origin that were developed among natives."" As Hawaii's
highest court explained, Hawaii's system of water rights "is based upon and is
the outgrowth of ancient Hawaiian customs and the methods of Hawaiians in
dealing with the subject of water."" Accordingly, an understanding of the way
native Hawaiians treated water is necessary in order appreciate the way in
which the state governs water today.
A. THE ANCIENT HAWAIIAN SYSTEM OF WATER

Historically, water in Hawaii belonged to the King, who governed through
a system akin to feudalism. The King owned all the land and set aside some
portion of the land for himself and divided the remaining land between his
chiefs, who in turn subdivided it aniong "lesser chiefs and ultimately to tenant
commoners who occupied and cultivated the soil."" Although certain rights
accompanied the possession of land-such as for water and fishing-there was
no concept of private ownership in water under this ancient system." Instead,
"water privileges were earned through participation in the construction of the
irrigation systems" and "were retained only by the productive application of
the waters to which one was thereby entitled."' In fact, when the Kingdom of
Hawaii adopted its first written constitution in 1840, it stated that although all
land on the Islands belonged to the King, "it was not his own private property"
but "belonged to the chiefs and people in common, of whom [the King] was
the head."" Accordingly, no person had the right to convey land without the
consent of an individual authorized to act on behalf of the kingdom." Before
the Great Mahele, therefore, "all land remained in the public domain.""
B. PRIVATE OWNERSHIP IN WATER

In 1848, in an event known as the Great Mahele," the King divided all
lands in Hawaii between himself, the chiefs, the agents of the chiefs (known as
konohiki'), and finally, the people themselves.' Each division of land is called

ian Commoner Rights in Land, 64 WASH. L. REV. 233, 234 n.6 (1989) (cautioning against
"forceling] an Anglo-American legal construct on a uniquely Hawaiian social reality").
15. 2 HUTCHINS, supranote 14, at 173.
16. Territory v. Gay, 31 Haw. 376, 395 (1930), alfd, 52 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1931).
17. Bradford H. Lamb, Robinson v. Anyoshi: A FederalIntrusion Upon State Water Law,
17 ENvTL. L. 325, 328-29 (1987).
18. 2 HurCHINS, supranote 14, at 173.
19. Lamb, supm note 17, at 329.
20. HAW. CONST. of 1840, availableathttp://www.hawaii-nation.org/constitution-1840.htmi.
21. Id.
22. Lamb, supra note 17, at 330.
23. See McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1336 n.5 (Haw. 1973) (defining
"Mahele" as "to divide or apportion").
24. Lamb, supra note 17, at 325 (defining "Konohiki" as "an agent of the chief in charge of
... ahupuaas").
25. HUTCHINS, supa note 14, at 173; Neil M. Levy, Native HanaiianLand Rights, 63
CAL. L. REV. 848, 854-55 (1975).
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an "ahupuaa."" Until 1973, the courts in Hawaii adhered to the system of
ownership in water the Mahele land division established.' Under this system,
water running through an ahupuaa was considered private property and belonged to the owner of that division of land, who derived title to their lands
through the Mahele.' The Hawaiian courts repeatedly held that an owner of
land had private ownership of surplus water of a stream.' In 1867, for example, the court in Peck v. Baily approved a diversion of water from land with
appurtenant water rights to a tract of dry land, stating that "lilt is very evident
that each party has rights to the water courses running through their lands."'
Similarly, in its 1904 decision in Hawilm Commercial& Sugar Co. v. Wai/uku Sugar Co., the court held that konohkis could transfer surplus waters without limitation." The court explicitly stated that surplus water "is the property of
the konohbik, to do with as he pleases."" Finally, in 1930, the court in Terntory v. Gay held that a sugar company that owned a division of land owned the
surplus water of the stream, and could use the waters however it wished, irrespective of the impact the diversion had on downstream users.'
C. A SHIFT TO PUBLIC OWNERSHIP OF WATER: JUDICIAL,
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY ADOPTION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST

In 1973, despite this long line of cases treating water as private property,
the Hawaii Supreme Court in McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson "reversed
course" and held that all freshwater within the state is "held in trust by the state
for the common good of its citizens."' McBryde involved a dispute between

26. Lamb, supra note 17, at 325 (defining an "ahupuaa" as "a division of land running from
mountains to the sea").
27. 'lao Ground Water Mgmt. Area, Case No. CCH-MAO6-01, 162 (Final Decision)
(Comm'n
on
Water
Res.
Mgmt.
2010),
http://www.state.hi.us/dlnr/cwrm/cch/cchma060l/CCHMAO601-02.pdf ("Starting with the very
first water case addressed by the Hawaii Supreme Court and continuing until 1973, surface
waters in Hawai'i could be treated as private property.").
28. See Christine Daleiden, Hawaii's Ditch Systems: Water Allocation After the Sugar
Cane, 10 JUL Haw. BJ. 28, 28 (2006).
29. Eg.,Carter v. Territory, 24 Haw. 47, 70 (1917); Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar Co. v.
Wailuku Sugar Co., 15 Haw. 675, 680, 682-83 (1904); see also 2 HUTCHINS, supra note 14,
at 176 (Surplus water refers to water "in excess of that required to satisfy the [existing rights]
attaching to the waters of such stream."); Wailuku Sugar Co., 15 Haw. at 680 (noting that surplus water is "the water, whether storm water or not, that is not covered by prescriptive rights
and excluding also riparian rights, if there are any.") (citation omitted). This is significant given
that surplus water constituted the majority of the surface waters. See Williamson B.C. Chang,
JudicialTakings: Robinson v. Ari'oshiRevisited,21 WIDENER LJ. 655, 663-64 (2012).
30. Peck v. Bailey, 8 Haw. 658, 671 (1867).
31.
Wailuku Sugar Co., 15 Haw. at 680 ("It is undisputed and clear that such tunnel water
is the property of the defendant and may be used by it as it sees fit.").
32. Id.; see also McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1336 (Haw. 1973).
33. Territory v. Gay, 31 Haw. 376, 377, 388 (1930) (involving the territory of Hawaii's
attempt to enjoin the Hawaiian Sugar Company from diverting water).
34. Final Decision, Case No. CCH-MAO6-01, 1,163 (Comm'n on Water Res. Mgmt.
2010), http://www.state.hi.us/dlnr/cwrm/cch/cchma0601/CCHMAO601-02.pdf (citing McBryde
Sugar Co., 504 P.2d 1330).
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two sugar companies over water in the Hanapepe River." After the construction of a tunnel diminished the flow of the river, the McBryde Sugar Company-one of the primary users of Hanapepe water-filed suit against a number of
smaller water rights holders and sought a declaration of the water rights along
the river." In its landmark decision, the court held that the state was the owner
of all of the water flowing through the river, and that while the owners of riparian or appurtenant water rights were entitled to use the water, they had no
property right in the water itself.' The court explained that because water is
"common property to be used by all who had a right of access to it," no individual "may acquire property to running water in a natural watercourse."
According to the McBryde court, the right to water under the Mahele "was
not intended to be, could not be, and was not transferred to the awardee, and
the ownership of water in natural watercourses, streams and rivers remained in
the people of Hawaii for their common good."" Interestingly, the court stated
that none of its prior decisions had established "[tihe owner of an Ahupuaa
may apply the water belonging to it to what land he pleases," and that even if
they had established such a rule, they did so in dictum." In a later decision,
however, the Hawaii Supreme Court explained that its decision in McBryde
"was premised on the firm conviction that prior courts had largely ignored the
mandates of the rulers of the Kingdom and the traditions of the native Hawaiians" and "was a necessary and proper step in the rectification of basic misconceptions concerning water 'rights' in Hawaii."" Similarly, in Waidhole
Ditch, the court explained that "Post-MLahele water rights decisions ignored
th[e] duty, [encompassed in the water resources trust], treating public water
resources as a commodity reducible to absolute private ownership, such that
no limitation existed or was supposed to exist to the owner's power to use the
waters as he saw fit."" However, the court noted that, "Iblased on founding
principles of the ancient Hawaiian system and present necessity, this court

35. McBryde, 504 P.2d at 1333.
36. Id. at 1334 (noting that "both McBryde and Gay & Robinson are diverting water from
the Hanapepe River basin, so much so that the mouth of the Hanapepe River is practically dry
throughout the year."); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468, 1470 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 477
U.S. 902 (1986) ("McBryde sued. . . to obtain a declaration of the rights of various parties along
the Hanapepe upstream and downstream to various water rights, appurtenant, prescriptive,
'ancient,' or otherwise derived.").
37. McBryde, 504 P.2d at 1345.
38. Id.at 1339.
39. Id (referring not only to the Mahele but also the subsequent Land Commission Award
and issuance of Royal Patent).
40. Id. at 1335-37. See Elizabeth Ann Ho-oipo Kala'ena'auao Pa Martin et al., Culturesm2
Con/lct m Hawaif.- The Law and Poltics of Natve Hawadan Water Rights, 18 U. HAw. L.
REV. 71, 100 n.71 (1996) ("Property interests in the water itself were extinguished as owners
merely had appurtenant or riparian rights to use, not to own water.").
41. Reppun v. Bd. of Water Supply, 656 P.2d 57, 67, 69 (Haw. 1982). See generallyid at
63-69 (re-examining the development of Hawaiian water law and upholding the conclusions
and rationale of the McBryde decision).
42. Waidhole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 451 (Haw. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
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finally reasserted the dormant public interest in the equitable and maximum
beneficial allocation of water resources."'
In an attempt to explain the McBryde court's seemingly radical departure
from its previous decisions, one commentator noted that the justices on the
Hawaii Supreme Court in 1973 saw a conflict "between the traditional Hawaiian values and laws, on the one hand, and the Western approach which had
guided [its previous decisions], on the other hand."" The court further observed the way other states approached water rights and realized that none of
the states seemed to "permit private ownership of water in the manner that the
Hawaii Supreme Court had apparently approved.""
Regardless of reason for the court's dramatic shift towards recognition of
the public trust, the concept of public ownership in water was reaffirmed when
Hawaii incorporated the public trust doctrine into its constitution in 1979, and
again in 1987 with the adoption of the state's Water Code." Article XI, Section
1, of the Hawaii Constitution states "[alll public natural resources are held in
trust by the State for the benefit of the people."' Accordingly, it imposes a duty
on the State to "conserve" and "protect" its natural resources "[flor the benefit
of present and future generations" and^ to promote their use and development
"in a manner consistent with their conservation."" Article XI, Section 7 further
provides that the State "has an obligation to protect, control and regulate the
use of Hawaii's water resources for the benefit of its people."" As the Hawaii
Supreme Court noted in Waiahole Ditch, the Hawaii Constitution explicitly
adopted the public trust doctrine "as a fundamental principle of constitutional
law in Hawaii."' Moreover, when the legislature enacted the State Water Code
in 1987 to protect Hawaii's surface and ground water resources, it "engrafted
the [public trust] doctrine wholesale in the Code.""
Since departing from the private property paradigm for water in 1973,
Hawaii's modern laws governing water have often clashed with the State's historical system of water rights, especially in cases where decades-old private
diversions conflict with public interests in water. As the Commission explains,
the duty to treat water as a public trust resource-which the McBryde decision
initiated and a constitutional amendment and enactment of the Water Code
later confirmed-"fundamentally turns on its head the laws that were prevailing
when the ditches [at issue in the Four Great Waters case] were constructed
and whose diversion practices continue to this day."".

43.

Id. (citations omitted).

CAROL WILCOX, SUGAR WATER: HAWAI'S PLANTATION DITcHEs 36 (1996).
45. Id.
46. HAw. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 7; HAw. REV. STAT. § 174C (2013).
47. Id. S 1.
48. Id.
49. Id. S 7.
50. Wadhole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 444 (Haw. 2000).
51. Id. at 442.
52. FoalDecision, Case No. CCH-MA06-01, 162 (Comm'n on Water Res. Mgmt. 2010),
http://www.state.hi.us/dlnr/cwrm/cch/cchma060l/CCHMA0601-02.pdf (citing McBryde Sugar
Co., 504 P.2d 1330).
44.
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II. THE "FOUR GREAT WATERS' CASE
A. HISTORY OF DIVERSIONS IN THE NA WAI 'EHA
At the heart of the Four Great Waters case is a system of streams in Central Maui called Na Wai 'Eha. ' Na Wai 'Eha--otherwise known as "the four
great waters of Maui"-is the collective name for the Waihe'e River and the
Waiehu, 'Iao, and Waikapfl streams.' Given the abundance of water flowing
through the Waihe'e River and the Waiehu, 'Iao, and Waikap5i streams, the
water resources of the Na Wai 'Eha played a prominent role in the culture of
ancient Hawaiians and even supported the second largest population on
Maui.' Describing the historical importance of the Na Wai 'Eha, the Commission explains:
Idjue to the profusion of fresh-flowing water in ancient times, Na Wai 'Eha
supported one of the largest populations and was considered the most abundant area on Maui; it also figured centrally in Hawaiian history and culture in
general.... The four ahupua'a of Na Wai 'Eha and their streams comprised
the largest continuous area of wetland taro cultivation in the islands. . .. In
addition to extensive agricultural production, traditional and customary practices thrived in Na Wai 'Eha, including the gathering of upland resources.'
The waters of the Na Wai 'Eha continue to play a central role in modem
Hawaiian life. The streams help recharge the groundwater supplies upon
which more than half of Maui's population relies." In addition, their streamflows are essential to the ecological health of Maui, providing crucial habitat
for a variety of fish and wildlife species. ' The Commission itself ranked the Na
Wai 'Eha streams as "Blue Ribbon Resources," meaning they hold among the
"very best resources" of their kind."
Despite their ecological and cultural importance, users have diverted the
waters of the Na Wai 'Eha to irrigate sugar plantations for more than a century. This diversion has left many of the streams dry.' Today, two private companies divert the majority of the Na Wai 'Eha streams: the Hawaiian Com-

53. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d 129, 132 (Haw. 2012).
54. Id. (stating that the Waihe'e and the 'lao are two of Maui's largest rivers).
55. FinalDecision,Case No. CCH-MAO6-01 at 10.
56. Id.at 8-9.
EARTIJUSTICE,
Na
Wai
'Eha,
57. Background
on
http://earthjustice.org/features/background-on-na-wai-eha (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).
58. See Final Decision, Case No. CCH-MAO6-01 at 13-14 (describing the various amphidromous fish species living in the Na Wai 'Eha streams); see also id.
59. FinalDecision,Case No. CCH-MAO6-01 at 13.
60. Id. at 17 (recognizing that "stream flows in Hawaii have decreased significantly over a
90-year period."). Historically, an average of about 67 mgd was diverted from the four streams
for sugar cane irrigation. Id. at 32. See also Restore Stream Flow, EARTIJUSTICE,
http://earthjustice.org/ourwork/campaigns/restore-stream-flow (last visited Oct. 17, 2013); D.
Kapua'ala Sproat, Wai Through KanawKai Water for Ha waiis Streams andjustice for Hanwan
Conmumnties, 95 MARQ. L. REv. 127, 145 n.82 (2011) (documenting the history of the state's
sugar plantations over the past 150 years).
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mercial & Sugar ("Sugar Company"), the last remaining sugar plantation in the
State; and the Wailuku Water Company ("Wailuku"), a former sugar plantation that sold all of its lands for private development and is now in the business
of selling the diverted stream water to the public." Wailuku-the largest diverter of Na Wai 'Eha water"-began cultivating sugar cane in 1862." Although
Wailuku ceased its sugar operations in 1988, it continues to divert large
amounts of water, which it delivers to customers using the Wailuku Ditch System." In addition to its water-delivery agreements with the Maui County Department of Water Supply ("Water Department") and the Sugar Company,
Wailuku provides water to a variety of other entities, including real estate and
business developers, a golf course, and irrigation companies using the water
for dust control.' These diversions have had a devastating impact on the
streams of the Na Wai 'Eha. According to the Commission, Wailuku, the
Sugar Company, and three additional water users currently divert all of the
dry-weather flows of the Waihe'e River and the Waiehu Stream." Furthermore, both the 'lao and the Waikapu streams are often dry downstream of the
diversions, at least partially as a result of the diversions."
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2004, Earthjustice represented two community organizations-Hui o Na
Wai 'Eha ("Hui") and Maui Tomorrow Foundation"-in petitioning Hawaii's
Commission on Water Resource Management to amend the instream flow
standards for the Na Wai 'Eha water system." Instream flow standards designate the amount of water that must remain in a stream 'to protect fishery, wildlife, recreational, aesthetic, scenic, and other beneficial instream uses."" Accordingly, these standards also determine the amount of water diverted from
the streams and are the water code's primary tool for protecting surface waters

61. See generallyMoriwake, supra note 5.
62. See Final Decision, Case No. CCH-MA06-01 at 32-33; No Be Lolo! Get the Facts,
EARTIJUSTICE, http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/library/factsheets/fiction-v-fact.pdf (last
visited Oct. 24, 2012).
63.

FinalDecision, Case No. CCH-MA06-01 at 32.

64. Id. at 26; Answering Brief for Petitioner-Appellee at 6, Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d
129 (Haw. 2012) (No. SCAP-30603).
65. See Appellee Commission on Water Resource Management's Answering Brief, supra
note 64, at 6. Currently, Wailuku alone diverts seventy to ninety percent of the Waihe' e River's
annual total flow, as well as forty to sixty percent of the North Waiehu stream, thirty to fifty
percent of the 'Tao stream, and sixty to eighty percent Waikapti stream. FinalDecision, Case
No. CCH-MA06-01 at 32-33.
66. FinalDecision,Case No. CCH-MA06-01, at 60-62.
67. Id. at 146.
68. Id.
69. Maui Tomorrow is a nonprofit organization focused on protecting Maui's "irreplaceable
open space and natural areas." MAUI ToMoRRow, http://maui-tomorrow.org/?pageid-303
(last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
70. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d 129, 131 (Haw. 2012).
71. HAW. REV.STAT. § 174C-3 (2013).
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in accordance with the public trust." The Commission also sets interim instream flow standards ("IIFS") in order to "protect the public interest pending
the establishment of a permanent instream flow standard."" In their petition,
the community organizations argued that the IIFS for the Na Wai 'Eha
streams-which had been in place since 1988"--failed to adequately protect the
environmental concerns, recreational activities, and native Hawaiian practices
the public trust safeguards." Accordingly, they requested that the Commission
amend the IIFS for each stream in order to restore streamflows sufficient to
protect these uses."
Around the same time, the Commission received several applications for
use of groundwater from the 'Iao Aquifer System, which is located in the
mountains above the Na Wai 'Eha and serves as a source of the Na Wai
'Eha streams." Under the water code, the Commission may designate "water
management areas" to regulate surface and ground water use whenever disputes arise over the use of water within a certain geographic area." After the
72. Waiihole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 460 (Haw. 2000) (explaining that instream flow standards
are "the primary mechanism by which the Commission is to discharge its duty to protect and
promote the entire range of public trust purposes dependent upon instream flows."). The
Commission is required to set IFS for each stream "whenever necessary to protect the public
interest in the waters of the State." HAw. REv. STAT. § 174C-71(1) (2013).
73. HAw. REV. STAT. § 174C-71(2)(A) (2013).
74. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 131. See also Final Decision, Case No. CCH-MAO601, 141 (Comm'n on Water Res. Mgmt. 2010), http://www.state.hi.us/dinr/cwrm/cch/
cchma0601/CCHMAO601-02.pdf. However, the court noted an important difference between
the 1988 IIFS and the IIFS included in the current decision: While the Commission set the
IIFS in 1988 as the status quo at that time "without further amounts of water being diverted
offstream through new or expanded diversions," the Commission's decision at issue stated that
"the IIFS will 'remain' as established above diversions, but does not contain the restriction
limiting new or expanded diversions." Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 132 n.2. (citing HAw.
CODE. R. S 13-169-48 (LexisNexis 1988)).

75. See FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 136.
76. Id. Specifically, they argued that the Commission "violated the constitutional public
trust's and Code's protections of instream uses by abandoning 'lao and Waikapi Streams,"
"violated its constitutional duties to protect Native Hawaiian rights to the extent feasible," "reversed the public trust's and Code's mandates by maximizing offstream diversions and failing to
hold private commercial users to their burden of proving maximum reasonable-beneficial use,"
"failed to consider and mitigate the impact of variable offstream demand on instream needs,"
"failed to hold HC&S to its burden of proving that use of Well 7 is not practicable," "failed to
hold the Companies to their burden of justifying their system losses," "failed to consider the
practicability of recycled water resources," and "erroneously inflated HC&S's acreages by adding
two new fields used only for wastewater disposal." Brief for Petitioner at 14-15, Four Great
Waters, 287 P.3d at 129.
77. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 132. The Commission received applications from the
Maui County Department of Water Supply, a county agency providing water to approximately
35,700 services on Maui and Molokai, Departmentof Water Supply: Our Mission, COUNTY OF
MAUI, HAwAII, http://www.co.maui.hi.us/index.aspx?nid-126 (last visited Sept. 15, 2013), and
the Wailuku Water Company, the successor of the Wailuku Sugar Company, Partners: WauWATERSHED
P'SHIP,
W.
MAUI
MOUNTAINS
ku
Water Company, LLC.,
http://www.westmauiwatershed.org/about-wmmwp/partners (ast visited Sept. 15, 2013).
78. HAw. REv. STAT. § 174C-41 (2013) (governing water management area designations);
Id. S 174C-3 (defining "water management area"); see also Comm'n on Water Res. Mgmt,
Surface Water Management Areas, HAw. DEFT. OF LAND & NAT. RES.,
http://state.hi.us/dinr/cwrm/sw.ma.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2013) [hereinafter Surface Water
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Commission designates a water source as a water management area, all existing
users have one year to file a Water Use Permit Application ("WUPA")." After
the Commission designated the 'lao Aquifer System a Ground Water Management Area ("GWMA") in 2003, the Water Department, the Sugar Company, and Wailuku filed permit applications." Because the water systems in
the Na Wai 'Eha are connected-and because instream standards limit the
amount of remaining water users can divert for offstream uses"-the Commission decided to consider the permit applications and IIFS petition together in
a combined case hearing, or "Contested Case Hearing.""
In April of 2009, the Commission's hearing officer issued a proposed decision resolving the WUPAs and setting IIFS for the Na Wai 'Eha." By
amending the IIFS for each of the four streams, the proposal would have restored 34.5 million gallons a day to Na Wai 'Eha, approximately half of the
diverted flows.' The proposed decision also required that the Sugar Company
use Well No. 7-an alternative water source to Na Wai 'Eha water-to satisfy
fourteen million gallons per day (mgd) of the company's water requirements.'
In its final decision, however, the Commission rejected many of the conclusions contained in the proposal." The Commission amended the IIFS for
two of the four streams, but essentially retained the existing IIFS for the other
two streams." It directed the companies to return only 12.5 mgd-less than a
fifth of the total diversions-to Waihe'e River and the Waiehu Stream."
Moreover, because the Commission "maintained the status quo" for the 'Tao
and Waikapti streams, it did not restrict any of the parties' diversions from
Management Areas] (noting that the Commission will designate such areas when it "finds that
serious disputes respecting the use of surface water resources are occurring.").
79. HAw. REv. STAT. S 174C-50(a) ("All existing uses of water in a designated water management area . . . may be continued after the effective date of designation only with a permit
issued in accordance with [the code]."); id. § 174C-50(c) ("An application for a permit to continue an existing use must be made within a period of one year from the effective date of designation.").
80. FourGreat Waters,.287 P.3d at 135. See also Surface Water ManagementAreas, supra
note 78.
81. See Final Decision, Case No. CCH-MA06-01, 6-8 (Comm'n on Water Res. Mgmt.
2010), http://www.state.hi.us/dlnr/cwrm/cch/cchma060l/CCHMAO601-02.pdf.
82. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 132, 134. As the concurrence pointed out, "[ilnasmuch
as the Commission held a combined contested case hearing, there was the potential question of
whether rights granted by issuance of permits in the WUPA process might adversely affect
Petitioners' constitutional rights in the IIFS determination." Id. at 175 (Acoba, J., concurring).
Note that in 2008, while the hearings were pending, the Commission designated the four
streams of the Na Wai 'Eha as a Surface Water Management Area. Id. at 135. Like the
GWMA designation, this triggered the requirement that all users currently diverting water from
the streams obtain existing use permits in order to continue any diversion from these streams
after the IIFS is established. See FinalDecision, Case No. CCH-MA06-01 at 162.
83. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 136.
84. See id. at 136-37.
85. Id.at 137.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 137-38.
88. FinalDecision, Case No. CCH-MAO6-01, 173-74 (Comm'n on Water Res. Mgmt.
2010), http://www.state.hi.us/dlnr/cwrm/cch/cchma060l/CCHMAO601-02.pdf.
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those streams." The final decision also lowered the amount of water it required the Sugar Company to pump from alternative sources." Hui and Maui
Tomorrow, along with the Office of Hawaiian Affairs ("OHA"), challenged
the Commission's decision and sought review of its conclusions in court."

III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
A. JURISDICTION

The facts giving rise to the Four Great Waters decision are remarkably
similar to those in Waidhole Ditch. As in Waiihole Ditch, sugar plantations
had historically diverted the streams at issue in Four Great Waters, which continued to suffer decreased flows even after the decline of the sugar industry."
The Commission's designation of a groundwater management area in both
cases triggered the requirement that existing users apply for water use permits."
In addition to these permit applications, the Commission in both instances
received petitions to amend the IIFS affected by existing diversions and held a
combined contested case hearing to resolve both the IIFS petitions and water
use permit applications." And, as in Waidhole Ditch, the affected parties challenged the Commission's decision establishing IIFS and resolving permit applications for existing water users in court."
Despite the striking similarities between the Four Great Waters and the
Waiahole Ditch cases, however, one important fact distinguishes the two. In
Wadhole Ditch, the parties seeking an upward amendment of the IIFS had
also filed permits to reserve water." In contrast, neither Hui nor Maui Tomorrow-the two parties seeking an upward amendment of the IIFS from the
Commission in this case-filed permits to reserve water, thereby calling into
question their ability to participate in the proceedings. The court's exercise of
jurisdiction over this case, therefore, represents a significant expansion of the
public trust by increasing the number of individuals and organizations able to
assert it.

89.

See Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 137-38.

9 0.

Id.

91. Id. at 138. Although the parties originally filed their opening briefs in the Hawaii Court
of Appeals, the Hawaii Supreme Court granted their application to transfer the case to the supreme court. Id.
92. See Background on Na Wai 'Eha,supra note 57.
93. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d 129, 131 (Haw. 2012); Wadhole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 423
(Haw. 2000) (citing, interaha,HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 174C-41(a), 47(a) (1993)).
94. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 132; Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 422, 425, 428-29.
95. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 132; Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 422.
96. Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 424. Several entities, including the WaikAne Community
Association, Hakipu'u 'Ohana, and Ka IAhui Hawai'i (collectively, "WWCA") filed petitions to
reserve water under HAw. REv. STAT. § 174C-49(d), which states that the Commission "may
reserve water in such locations and quantities and for such seasons of the year as in its judgment
may be necessary. Such reservations shall be subject to periodic review and revision in the light
of changed conditions; provided that all presently existing legal uses of water shall be protected."
Id. at 423 n.3.
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Although the Commission, the Sugar Company, and Wailuku each challenged the court's jurisdiction and claimed that the Hui and Maui Tomorrow
lacked standing because they had no property interest in the increased streamflows, the court flatly rejected these arguments." In addition to holding that it
had jurisdiction over the challenge to the Commission's decision, the court
"t[ook] th[e] opportunity to elaborate on the jurisdictional analysis
from [ Waihole Ditch]."" The court's analysis of jurisdiction is significant, as it
represents a dramatic extension of Wazahole Ditch and extends the right to
enforce the public trust beyond the class of individuals claiming traditional
water rights.
1.Jurisdiction Under the State's Water Code
In Hawaii, judicial review of the Commission's decisions may only occur
in a "contested case," which the courts have interpreted as an agency hearing
that (i) is required by law and (ii) determines "the rights, duties, or privileges of
specific parties."" Regarding the first criteria for a contested case hearing, the
court noted that the law may require an agency hearing, either pursuant to a
statute, administrative rule, or by constitutional due process." Although the
court recognized that neither a statute nor administrative rule required a hearing to set an IIFS,"' it found that the setting of an IIFS implicates constitutional
due process." Regarding the second criteria for review of a contested case
hearing, the court found that the Commission's setting of the IIFS involved a
determination of individual water rights." According to the court, the Commission's decision, by retaining the existing IIFS for two of the streams, "necessarily affected [the organization members'] access to water" by "endors[ing]
the upstream diversions that remove water" from those streams."
To have a due process right to an administrative hearing, a party must
have a property interest within the meaning of the due prdcess clause, which,
in turn, requires that the individual possess a "legitimate claim of entitlement"-not merely a "unilateral expectation."" According to the court, Hui
97. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 139-45.
98. Id. at 140.
99. Id. (citing Pele Def. Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 881 P.2d 1210, 1213-14 (Haw.
1994)). The state's water code provides that "[alny person aggrieved by a final decision and
order in a contested case . .. is entitled to judicial review thereof under this chapter ..... HAW.
REV. STAT. § 9 1-14(a) (2013).
100. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 140 (citing Pele Def Fund, 881 P.2d at 1214).
101. Id. In fact, the water code defines an IIFS as ".a temporary instream flow standard of
immediate applicability, adopted by the commission without the necessity of a public hearing,
and terminating upon the establishment of an instream flow standard." HAW. REv. STAT. §
174C-3(9); see also Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 431 n.15 (Haw. 2000) (noting that neither the
water code nor the Commission's rules require a hearing regarding petitions to amend IIFS)
(citing HAw. REV. STAT. S 174C-3).
102. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 140.
103. Id. at 143.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 140-41 (citing Sandy Beach Def. Fund v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 773 P.2d
250, 260 (Haw. 1989)).
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and Maui Tomorrow had a property interest in the Commission's amendment
of the IIFS because members of the two organizations "own or reside on land
in the area of Nd Wai 'Eha and rely upon that water to exercise traditional and
customary rights . . . ."" The court distinguished Sandy Beach Defense Fund

v. City Counc, a case in which plaintiffs challenged a city council's issuance of
permits to developers pursuant to the Coastal Zone Management Act by asserting property interests of an "aesthetic and environmental nature."". Holding that this did not constitute a "property interest," the court in Sandy Beach
explained that "[w~hile we have recognized the importance of aesthetic and
environmental interests in determining an individual's standing to contest the
issue, we have not found that such interests rise to the level of 'property' within
the meaning of the due process clause . . . ."'
Significantly, the court in Four Great Waters held that Hui and Maui
Tomorrow asserted interests that were "readily distinguishable" from those at
issue in Sandy Beach.'" First, while the parties in Sandy Beach were not "owners of property contiguous to the development" at issue,"' the court explained
that Hui and Maui Tomorrow "own or reside on land in the area of Ni Wai
'Eha, and rely upon that water to exercise traditional and customary rights,
including kalo fanning.""' Second, the court noted the interests of the community organizations had statutory support because the water code specifically
"supportis] their entitlement to water for kalo farming.""' Although the relevant provisions in the water code specifically refer to Native Hawaiian rights
and appurtenant rights,"' the court's notion of property was not so limited. The
court explained that property interests:
are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimen-

sions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain
benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits."'

Thus, the Commission could have used the same rationale to find a similar
property interest had the community organization members not been Native
Hawaiians. Because the water code explicitly supports a broader array of additional statutorily designated instream uses- including ecological, recreational,
and even aesthetic values" -and because Wam-hole Ditch held that public trust

106. Id.at 143.
107. SandyBeach DeL Fund,773 P.2d at 260-61.
108. Id.at 261 (citation omitted).
109. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 143.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Specifically, the court referenced HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 174C-101(c)-(d) (2013) ("Native
Hawaiian water rights"), and HAw. REV. STAT. S 174C-63 (2013) ("Appurtenant rights").
114. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 142 (citing Int'l Broth. of Painters & Allied Trades v.
Befitel, 88 P.3d 647, 655 (Haw. 2004)).
115. HAw. REV. STAT. § 174C-3.
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doctrine was "engrafted" wholesale into the code,"' the Commission should
have accepted this rationale as sufficient so long as members of the community
organizations simply resided in the Na Wai 'Eha area and relied upon that
water to exercise recreational or aesthetic rights."'
Even without extending its rationale to include purely aesthetic interests,
for example, the court's finding of jurisdiction is nevertheless significant because it expands the notion of standing articulated in its previous Waidhole
Ditch decision, which contained only a brief analysis of jurisdiction. In a footnote, the court in WaiThole Ditch found that it had jurisdiction "because of
the individual instream and offstream 'rights, duties, and privileges' at stake.""
However, unlike the parties in the current case, each of the parties that sought
to amend the IIFS in Wahole Ditch had also filed water permit applications."' Waihole Ditch required a hearing for the private companies, therefore, only because amending the IIFS would impact the petitioner's permit
applications." In contrast, neither Hui nor Maui Tomorrow applied for a
permit in this case. Thus, the companies claimed that the organizations had no
right to appeal the Commission's decision under the State's Water Code and
lacked any type of general constitutional standing to challenge the amended
IIFS."' Therefore, the Commission, the Sugar Company, and Wailuku each
claimed that the court lacked jurisdiction over the case."
In fact, the Sugar Company warned that recognizing a property interest in
traditional and customary practices would be a "grave departure" from the
fundamental principle that "the range of interests protected by procedural due
process is not infinite."" According to the company:

lal sea change in the law would result ifan agency's denial of a request to enable the expansion of Native Hawaiian traditional and customary practices
beyond the status quo ante were held to impinge on a "property interest"
within the meaning of the due process clause. While Hawai'i law recognizes
protections for such practices, never before has a Hawai'i appellate court
held that the right to engage in such practices constitute s] "property" per se,

116. Waidole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 442 (Haw. 2000).
117. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 143.
118. Wadhole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 431 n.15 (citing Pele Def. Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 881 P.2d 1210, 1214 (Haw. 1994)). With regard to the existing applications, the court
found that it had jurisdiction over the appeal because both the water code and the administrative
rules specifically required a hearing as part of the WUPA process. Id.
119. Id.at424.
120. Answering Brief for Appellee at * 14-15, FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d 129 (Haw. 2012)
(No. CCH-MAO6-01) [hereinafter Wluku Water Co.'s AnswenagBieA.
121. Answering Brief for Intervenor-Appellee at 22-23, Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d 129
(Haw. 2012) (No. 30603) [hereinafter SugarCo. AnsweringBrk4; id. at 15, 19.
122. Sugar Co. Answerig Brief, supra note 121, at 11; Wailuku Water Co.'s Answering
Bief; supra note 120, at 14-15.
123. Sugar Co. Answering Brief; supra note 121, at 17 (quoting Int'l Bd. of Painters & Allied
Trades v. Befitel, 88 P.3d 647, 655 (Haw. 2004)).
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nor has any court regarded as a "property interest" a claim of entitlement to
engage in such practices to a greater degree than in the present.'
Despite the Sugar Company's claim that recognizing a property interest in this
case would entail a radical departure from the court's precedent, and that "the
implications of setting such precedent would be far-reaching and profound,"
the court found that the community organizations had a stake in the streamflows protected by due process."
Significantly, the court rejected the claim that downstream users "cannot
assert property interests to more water than they currently use . . . ."" Accord-

ing to the Sugar Company, recognizing that members of the organizations had
a property interest simply because they exercise traditional and customary
rights in the area would "enable the law of traditional and customary rights to
be wielded as a sword for righting past wrongs rather than its current use as a
shield against further diminution caused by western notions of property
rights."" Nevertheless, the court explained that simply because downstream
water users have historically been deprived "does not negate those downstream users' interest in the water."" Citing Waiihole Ditch, the court noted
that neither Hawaii's Constitution nor its Water Code "differentiate among
'protecting,' 'enhancing,' and 'restoring' public instream values [like native
Hawaiian rights], or between preventing and undoing 'harm' thereto."" Accordingly, the court concluded that an IIFS determination implicates due process and that therefore, Hui and Maui Tomorrow had a right to judicial review."
2. Ko'olau Agricultural&the Importance ofJudicial Review of Decisions Impacting an Irreplaceable Res
Although the court found that its conclusions discussed above provided
sufficient support for its ruling, the court's discussion of jurisdiction did not
end there. Instead, the court stated that "the analysis of one more case merits
consideration."... To support their argument that the organizations had no
property interest in the IIFS, the companies had relied heavily on Ko'olau
124. Id.
125. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d 129,145 (Haw. 2012); id.
126. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 143. The court rejected the argument in Sugar Conpany Answering Briefthat the organizations were not deprived of any property interest because
establishing an IIFS does not implicate an individual's right to use water, but "merely specifies
the amount of water that must remain in a stream." Sugar Co. Answering Brie; supra note 121,
at 16. The Sugar Company noted that "Ibly definition, an instream flow standard represents the
volume of water that must remain in a particular stream." Id.
127. Sugar CornpanyAnsweringBrief; supra note 122, at 17.
128. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 143.
129. Id. (citing Wmaihole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 462 (Hawv. 2000)). In Wahole Ditch, the court
stated that "the public trust authorizes the Commission to reassess previous diversions and
allocations, even those made with due regard to their effect on trust purposes." Wadhole Ditch,
9 P.3d at 461.
130. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 145.131. Id. at 144.
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Agncultural Company v. Commission On Wter Resource Management,
which held that an agriculture company did not have a property interest in a
designated Water Management Area ("WMA").'" The Sugar Company argued
that the regulatory impact of setting an IIFS is akin to designating a WMA
because it is "generalized in nature;" it does not determine how much water a
particular individual or entity may withdraw, but simply designates the amount
of water that must flow through a stream at a particular location."" However,
the court noted several important differences between WMA designations and
IIFS determinations, including the type of analysis required for each, the necessity of judicial review, and the extent to which their resolution impacts the
rights of potential water users.'" According to the court, each of these factors
favored recognizing a due process right and, hence, a right to a hearing and
judicial review in the context of IIFS determinations."
Most important for purposes of this Article, the court emphasized the necessity of judicial review in cases dealing with public trust resources." Again
citing language from Waihole Ditch, the court noted that judicial review in
the public trust context "provides a level of protection against improvident
dissipation of an irreplaceable res."" According to the court, "the ramifications
of an erroneous IIFS could offend the public trust, and is simply too important to deprive parties of due process and judicial review."" Reaffirming its
holding in Wauhole Ditch, the court stated that "[iln short, the IIFS matter
[because] Itihey have both immediate and lasting impacts on individual water
users."" The court held that the petitioners had a right to judicial review of the
IIFS determinations on the grounds that such standards play an important role
in promoting the public trust." Thus, the Four Great Waters case opens the
door for members of the public to challenge a whole host of State actions and
decisions concerning the State's water resources trust. Moreover, by discarding
the traditional property-based view of water rights, the decision institutionalizes
a broader role for a much more expansive portion of the public to play in such
decisions.
3. Justice Acoba's Concurrence
Although Justice Acoba concurred in the court's decision to vacate and
remand to the Commission, he advocated for a finding of jurisdiction by applying an even more expansive interpretation of the public trust doctrine."'
Justice Acoba would have found jurisdiction under the State's Water Code
132.
1996).
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Ko'olau Agric. Co. v. Conm'n On Water Res. Mgnt., 927 P.2d 1367, 1379 (Haw.
Sugar Co. Answerng Brie, supra note 121, at 22.
FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 144.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 145.
Id. (citing Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 465 (Haw. 2000)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 163-64 (AcobaJ., concurring).
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and Article XII, Section 7, of the Hawaii Constitution, which requires that the
State protect the traditional and customary rights of native Hawaiians." Furthermore, he claimed that the court would have had jurisdiction under the
Water Code and the Hawaii Constitution if the community organizations
claimed, in the combined contested hearing, that the two companies and the
Water Department's permit applications adversely affected their constitutional
rights." Here, Justice Acoba referred to Article XI, Section 1 of the Hawaii
Constitution, which establishes that "[aIll public natural resources are held in
trust by the State for the benefit of the people," and imposes a duty on the
State to protect these resources.'"
Most significantly, Justice Acoba argued that the community organizations
had a right to challenge the IIFS in court based Upon general public trust principles." He stated that the court's jurisdiction "arises under the public trust
doctrine embodied in Article XJ, Sections 1 and 7 of the Hawaii Constitution
as implemented through provisions [of the Water Code] affording judicial
review.'" Although Justice Acoba acknowledged that "standing to sue to enforce the public trust doctrine is uncertain under the I Waidhole Ditch court's]
reference to 'individual instream and offstream rights, duties, and privileges,"'
he argued that the organizations should have a valid claim based solely upon
public trust principles." Citing these overarching principles, Justice Acoba
explained that the Commission's establishment of IIFS "may violate the principles of preserving the right to water for 'the common good'"" and of "preventing 'private water rights' from 'injuriously affecting [] the rights of others.'"" He argued that, "consistent with such principles, a public trust claim
raised by members of the public who are affected by potential harm to the
public trust should be cognizable."" Accordingly, Justice Acoba concluded
that the law entitles the petitioners-"as members of the public who are affected by the setting of an IIFS"-were entitled to a hearing "in order to protect
the public trust.""'
Justice Acoba makes explicit what the FourGreat Waters majority implies
in its analysis: because judicial review of decisions involving public trust resources is an essential component of the doctrine and is necessary to protect
basic public trust principles, all individuals injured by harm to those resources
should be able to defend their interests in court""

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 164.
Id.
HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1; id.
Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 164.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1342 (Haw. 1973)).
Id. (citing Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 295 n.8 (Haw. 1982)).
Id. at 165.
Id.
Id.
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B. DECISION ON THE MERITS
In its declaration of policy, Hawaii's Water Code states that the Code
"shall be liberally interpreted to obtain maximum beneficial use of the waters
of the State."" In its landmark Waidhole Ditch decision, the Hawaii Supreme
Court interpreted this provision as not only mandating "liberal interpretation
in favor of maximnum beneficial use," but also "demandling] adequate provision for traditional and customary Hawaiian rights, wildlife, maintenance of
ecological balance and scenic beauty, and the preservation and enhancement
of the waters for various uses in the public interest.""
Turning to the merits, the Four Great Waters court first concluded that
the Commission violated its duty under the public trust doctrine by failing to
adequately consider the effects of its amended IIFS on traditional and customary native Hawaiian practices," which the State recognizes as a public trust
purpose." Although the court found that the Commission satisfied the first
step of the analysis by identifying the scope of traditional and customary native
Hawaiian rights, it concluded that the Commission failed to "articulate 'the
extent to which those resources I. . .] [would] be affected or impaired by the
proposed action,'" and failed to "specify what feasible action [could] be taken
to protect native Hawaiian rights.". The court noted that the Commission's
failure was particularly apparent with respect to its decision not to restore any
streamflow to two of the streams, the 'lao and the Waikapti." Given that the
users of the stream testified that their water was insufficient to support their
kalo farming needs," the court noted that the effect of the Commission's decision essentially meant denying these users the water they need to exercise their
traditional and customary right to cultivate kalo on their property."
Because it found that the Commission violated its duty to protect Native
Hawaiian rights to the extent feasible, the court vacated the Commission's
decision."' Remanding to the Commission, the court stated that, "IsIhould the
Commission determine that the amended IIFS will negatively impact protect-

153. HAw. REv. STAT. S 174C-2(c) (1999).
154. Wajilhole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 458 (Haw. 2000).
155. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 146.
156. Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 449 ("In line with this history and our prior precedent [] and
constitutional mandate, we continue to uphold the exercise of Native Hawaiian and traditional
and customary rights as a public trust purpose.") (citations omitted); see also HAw. REv. STAT. S
174C-101(c) (requiring the Commission to ensure that it does not abridge or deny traditional
and customary rights of Native Hawaiians); Ka Pa'akai 0 Ka'Aina v. Land Use Comm'n, 7 P.3d
1068, 1082 (Haw. 2000) (recognizing that Article XII, Section 7 of the Hawaii Constitution
"places an affirmative duty on the State and its agencies to preserve and protect traditional and
customary native Hawaiian rights" and provides the State and its agencies the power to discharge
this duty).
157. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 149 (citing Ka Pa'akaiO Ka Ama, 7 P.3d at 1084).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 149.
161. Id.at 150.
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ed native Hawaiian practices and that protection of those practices is feasible,
the Commission may enter amended IIFS to reflect that protection.""
1. Incomplete Analysis of Instream Uses

Hui and Maui Tomorrow next argued that the Commission violated the
public trust doctrine and the Water Code's protections of instream uses by

refusing to amend the IIFS for the two streams." The court agreed, noting that
the Commission's analysis of instream uses was incomplete because it only
considered one instream use-amphidromous species-and failed to fully consider other instream uses protected under the Code.'" The Water Code provides a non-exclusive list of statutorily designated instrean uses, which include:
(1) Maintenance of fish and wildlife habitats;
(2) Outdoor recreational activities;
(3) Maintenance of ecosystems such as estuaries, wetlands, and stream vegetation;
(4) Aesthetic values such as waterfalls and scenic waterways;
(5) Navigation;
(6) Instream hydropower generation;
(7) Maintenance of water quality;
(8) The conveyance of irrigation and domestic water supplies to downstream
points of diversion; and
(9) The protection of traditional and customary Hawaiian rights."
Although the court recognized that maintenance of fish and wildlife habitat is among the instream uses the Commission must consider, it noted that
the statute required the Commission to weigh all instream uses in setting
IIFS." While nothing prevented the Commission from retaining the IIFS for
the two streams had the Commission found that they "sufficiently protected"
the public interest, the court stated that the Commission failed to explain in its
decision why it focused on amphidromous species while ignoring evidence of
other instream uses." The court ordered the Commission to consider evidence of other instream uses on remand, because the Comnission had based
its decision not to restore water to two of the streams entirely on its conclusion
that they showed "limited 'reproductive potential' for amphidromous species.""
By emphasizing that the public trust requires consideration of a whole
range of public interests, the court affirmed that the doctrine is not limited in
the values it protects, but instead applies to a wide range of public interests in
water. This is an important holding consistent with the expansive conception

162.
163.

Id.
Id. at 132, 150.

164.

Id. at 133.

165.
166.
167.
168.

HAw. REv. STAT. S 174C-3 (1998).
Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 152.
Id.
Id.
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of the public recognized by the California Supreme Court in its seminal Nadonal Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County ("Mono Lake")
decision.'" As in that case, the Four Great Waters decision demonstrates that
in order to comply with the public trust, the State must adequately address all
evidence presented regarding a broad and continually evolving range of public
values in water." Combined with its expansive interpretation regarding which
individuals and entities may participate in hearings involving water resource
allocations, the court's decision opens the door to a more involved public and
requires that the public have a meaningful say in the protection of a whole
suite of public interests.
2. The State's Duties Under the Public Trust in Permitting Diversions
The court next addressed the Commission's approval of diversions. At the
outset, the court discussed the applicable burden of proof.'' Although the Water Code does not place the burden in the context of an IIFS petition on any
particular party, the court noted that its prior cases impose a duty on the
Commission to establish instream flows that "protect instream values to the
extent practicable' and 'protect the public interest."'" The court explained that
it would therefore base its review of the Commission's analysis of the stream
diversions upon the Commission's fulfillment of this duty.'3 According to the
court, in order to satisfy the "close look review governing public trust resources," a decision by the Commission must "evince[] 'a level of openness,
diligence, and foresight commensurate with the high priority these rights
command under the laws of [the] state.""'
Having articulated the appropriate burden of proof, the court next looked
at whether the Commission met this burden in calculating the diverting parties'
acreage, its treatment of system losses, and its consideration of alternative water sources."'According to the court, the Commission failed to meet its burden
in its calculation of the diverting parties' acreage." Hui and Maui Tomorrow
challenged the Commission's decision that allowed the Sugar Company to
include certain fields found to be marginal for farming in its acreage calcula-

169. Nat'1 Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983)
(noting that although public trust uses were "traditionally defined in terms of navigation, commerce and fisheries," they "are sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs" and
have been expanded to include an array of uses, such as fishing, hunting, bathing, swimming,
and boating).
170. See Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 152.
171. Id.at 154.
172. Id. (citing HAw. REV. STAT. § 174C-71(2)(A) (1988); in re Water Use Permit Applications ("Wadhole IF), 93 P.3d 643, 653 (Haw. 2004)). The community claimed that the Commission "failled] to hold private commercial users to their burden of proving maximum reasonable-beneficial use." Opening Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supi note 64, at 14-15.
173. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 154.
174. Id. (citing In reWaiola O Molokai, Inc., 83 P.3d 664, 685 (Haw. 2004)).
175. Id.at 156.
176. Id. In addition, the court held that the Commission improperly "took judicial notice of
facts affecting an alternative water source for the fields." Id.
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tion.'" Agreeing with the community groups, the court held that the Commission did not have sufficient evidence to support its decision to treat certain
fields differently in its acreage calculation.' Therefore, the court held that the
Commission violated the public trust by authorizing one of the companies to
divert Na Wai 'Eha water to irrigate two of its fields without providing sufficient analysis to support its decision."' The court explained that the Commission provided no evidence to support the wisdom of cultivating the two fields
and included them in the company's acreage without explanation." Accordingly, it held that the Commission's analysis failed to show that the Commission
"considered these fields with 'a level of openness, diligence, and foresight'
required when authorizing the diversion of our public trust res," and remanded to the Commission to reconsider whether to issue the Sugar Company a
permit to divert Na Wai 'Eha water to irrigate its fields.'
The court found that the Commission similarly failed to meet its burden
of "protectfing] instreamn values to the extent practicable" in its treatment of
losses from the diverting parties' ditch systems."' According to the court, the
Commission failed to meet this burden when it assumed that two of the diverters' could reduce losses to their systems by half by lining their reservoirs."
Citing Wazahole Ditch, the court noted that although reasonable estimates are
permitted at the early planning stages in setting an IIFS, the Commission failed
to provide any analysis regarding how it reached its estimate." Accordingly, the
court instructed the Commission to "'reasonably estimate' losses, mindful of
its duty to 'protect instream values to the extent practicable.'"" Thus, this part
of the decision demonstrates the heightened burden the court is willing to
place on water right holders to justify their continued use of the State's water.
However, the court upheld the Commission's decision to require that the
Sugar Company line its reservoir in order to prevent large system losses." In
so doing, the court read the Commission's power under the public trust doctrine broadly. In its celebrated Waidhole Ditch ruling, the court stated that the
authority and the duty of the State "to preserve the rights of present and future
generations in the waters of the state . . . empowers the state to revisit prior

diversions and allocations, even those made with due consideration of their
effect on the public trust.""' The court in the Four Great Waters case gives
meaning to this expansive articulation of the State's authority by noting that the
177. Id. Hui and Maui Tomorrow argued that the Commission violated the public trust
because it "erroneously inflated [the Sugar Company's] acreages by adding two new fields used
only for wastewater disposal." Opening Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 64, at 14-15.
178. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 156-57.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 157.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 159 (citing HAW. REv. STAT. § 174C-71(2)(A) (1988); Wahole II, 93 P.3d 643,
653 (Haw. 2004)).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 158.
187. Waidhole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 453.
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Commission's decision ordering the Sugar Company to line its reservoir in
order to prevent significant system losses is "commendable and shows the
'diligence' and 'foresight' expected of the Commission in its management of
the public trust.""
Finally, the court addressed the Commission's consideration of alternative
sources that the companies could use to irrigate their fields in place of Na Wai
' Eha water." The community organizations claimed that the Commission
failed to hold the Sugar Company to its burden of proving that it was not practicable for the company to use water from alternative sources, such as Well
No. 7 and recycled wastewater." In its final decision, the Commission determined that the Sugar Company was only required to pump 9.5 million gallons
per day from Well No. 7, which is less than it had used historically.' Moreover, it directed the company to pay only the additional cost of pumping from
this alternative source, not installation costs." The Commission claimed that
its consideration of the capital and energy cost to the Sugar Company of installing additional pipelines and pumps and running Well No. 7 justified this
decision." As the Commission noted, the Water Code requires that the
Commission weigh instream values with the importance of noninstream purposes, "including the economic impact of restricting such uses."" According to
the Commission, therefore, its decision was justified because "[tihe law does
not prescribe a specific method for weighing that economic impact.""
The court made clear that "guidance is necessary in this area" because the
Commission's two-pronged justification was "contradictory."" The court refuted the Commission's first argument that the Commission is not required to
analyze practicable alternatives when it sets IIFS.'" Under Waizhole Ditch,
operation of the trust requires the State to "consider the cumulative impact of
existing and proposed diversions on trust purposes and to implement reasonable measures to mitigate this impact""' The court therefore accepted the
188. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 158.
189. Id. at 159-63.
190. Opening Brief for Appellant-Petitioners, supra note 64, at 14-15.
191. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 160; Final Decision, Case No. CCH-MAO6-01, 171
(Comm'n on Water Res. Mgmt. 2010), http://www.state.hi.us/dlnr/cwrmI/cch/cchma0601/

CCHMAO601-02.pdf.
192. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 160; FinalDecision, Case No. CCH-MA06-01, at 171.
193. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 160; FinalDecision, Case No. CCH-MAO6-01, at 171.
For example, the Sugar Company estimated that it would cost approximately $475,000 to add
another pump and distribution line and more to reach Field 715. Id. at 85. In addition to the
capital and energy costs, the Commission considered the extent to which the increased pumping
would reduce recharge to the aquifer. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 160; Id. at 171.
194. FinalDecision,Case No. CCH-MA06-6 1, at 110 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. S174C-71(2))
("In considering a petition to adopt an interim instream flow standard, the commission shall
weigh the importance of the present or potential instream values with the importance of the
present or potential uses of water for noninstream purposes, including the economic impact of
restricting such uses.").
195. Id. at 142.
196. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 160.
197. Id.
198. Waidhole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 455 (Haw. 2000).
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Commission's second argument-that alternative sources must play a role in
the Commission's determination of an IIFS-because alternative sources necessarily "diminish[] the 'importance' of diverting Na Wai 'Eha water for noninstream use."'"

Moreover, while it acknowledged that the Counission must consider offstream uses, including the economic impact of restricting those uses, the court
rejected the notion that cost alone may be the determinative factor.' The
court cited the Water Code's declaration of policy, which states that "[the
state Water Code shall be liberally interpreted to obtain maximum beneficial
use of the waters of the State.""' Drawing upon this broad statement of policy,
the court concluded that "[a]llowing a water user to divert water from the public trust res when that user has exclusive access to an alternative water source
that is currently [unused] or under-used" would violate the Legislature's intent
as expressed in the Water Code." This conclusion is consistent with
Wadhole Ditch, in which the court stated that the Commission "is not obliged
to ensure that any particular user enjoys a subsidy or guaranteed access to less
expensive water sources when alternatives are available and public values are at
stake,"" and that "[sltream protection and restoration need not be the least
expensive alternative for offstream users to be 'practicable' from a broader,
long-term social and economic perspective."'
Significantly, the court emphasized that the State must adhere to the precautionary approach in deciding whether to approve use of water resources
protected by the public trust. The Wazahole Ditch decision praised adoption
of the precautionary principle, which only a limited number of public trust
cases have cited.' As the court explained in Waidhole Ditch, under the precautionary principle, where there is "considerable conflict or uncertainty in the
evidence," the Commission "must articulate its factual analysis with reasonable
clarity, giving some reason for discounting the evidence rejected."' It noted
that the public trust places the burden on permit applicants to justify their
proposed uses "in light of protected public rights in the resource"-a burden
imposed as a result of the doctrine's "inherent presumption in favor of public
use, access, and enjoyment.""
The Four Great Waters decision illustrates the extent to which the public
trust imposes a heightened duty on the State in authorizing consumptive uses
when faced with uncertainty or conflicting evidence about those uses. In dissenting from the Commission's final decision, the hearing officer asserted that
199. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 160.
200. Id. at 162-63.
201. Id. at 160 (citing HAw. REv. STAT. § 174C-2(c) (1993)).
202. Id. at 160.
203. Waidhole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 477 (quoting FnalDecision, Case No. CCH-MA06-01, 19
(Comm'n on Water Res. Mgmt 2010), http://www.state.hi.us/dlnr/cwrm/cch/cchma
0601/CCHMAO601-02.pdf).
204. Id. at 477.
205. Id. at 466-69.
206. FourGreat Waters, 287 P.3d at 152 (citing Warihole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 475-76).
207. Waidhole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 472.
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the Commission failed to meet its duty as "trustee of the state's public water
resources.""' One of his primary objections was that the Commission accepted
the Sugar Company's claim that restricting its ability to cultivate its entire west
Maui fields would force it to shut down all of its sugar operations." According
to the hearing officer, the Commission could not assume, absent additional
information supporting this "doomsday scenario," that the company's assertions "overcame the presumption in favor of the public trust resource, the
streams of Na Wai 'Eha.""
The court agreed, concluding that the Commission failed to meet this
burden by justifying a reduction in the amount of water the Sugar Company
was required to use from alternative sources based upon the cost to the company, even though the Commission acknowledged that it lacked the information needed to truly determine cost." Moreover, the court criticized the
Commission for adopting the diverting party's testimony without considering
evidence in the record that contradicted the company's arguments." Building
upon its decision in Waidhole Ditch, the court explained that, "[wihen such
critical information is missing, the Commission must 'take the initiative' to
obtain the information it needs.""
In conclusion, the court held that the Commission violated the public trust
in its consideration of Well No. 7 as an alternative source to diverting Na Wai
'Eha water."' Similarly, it found that the Commission erred by refusing to consider recycled wastewater as an alternative source to diverting Na Wai 'Eha
water "based solely on the current lack of infrastructure."' According to the
court, the Commission's consideration of alternative sources failed to demonstrate "a level of openness, diligence, and foresight commensurate with the
high priority these [public rights in water] command" under the public trust."'
IV. AN IMPORTANT EXPANSION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE
The Four GreatRivers decision contributes to the evolving concept of the
public trust in several ways. In its leading public trust case, the Supreme Court
in Illinois CentralRailroadCo. v. Illbrois held that "Itihe doctrine is founded
upon the necessity of preserving to the public the use of [waters protected by
the trust] from private interruption and encroachment.""' Thus, public owner208. FinalDecision,Case No. CCH-MA06-01, at 7 (Miike, Comm'r, dissenting).
209. Id. at 6-7.
210. Id.
211. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d at 163.
212. Id. at 161-62.
213. Id. at 163.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. (quoting In re Wai'ola 0 Moloka'i, Inc., 83 P.3d 664, 693 (Haw. 2004)).
217. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 436 (1892). Similarly, in Geer v. Connecticu4 the Court stated that "the power or control lodged in the state, resulting from this common
ownership, is to be exercised . .. as a trust for the benefit of the people, and not ... for the
benefit of private individuals as distinguished from the public good." Geer v. Connecticut, 161
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ship in a resource necessarily protects against private interests seeking to use
the resources for their own personal gain. The Four Great Waters decision
demonstrates that the public trust in Hawaii is capable of accomplishing this
fundamental purpose of the public trust doctrine.
Equally important is the decision's expanded view of standing, which
broadened the class of persons able to challenge decisions impacting trust
resources. The participation of everyday citizens made the most significant
successes in the development of the public trust doctrine possible-"by the
public protest of 'commoners' demanding that government exercise its public
trust mandate.". As one public trust scholar explains, the doctrine is "too valuable a public resource to leave with the legal profession, particularly at a time
when so few of my colleagues are defending public interests and resources are
being privatized on a truly massive scale."'9 Nevertheless, the public trust doctrine is criticized on the grounds that its impact is primarily seen at the administrative level. After analyzing the case law and administrative documents postMono Lake, Professor Dave Owen asserts that his "[m]ost striking" conclusion
concerns the doctrine's limited impact in the courts.'
However, the Four Great Waters decision suggests that-at least in Hawaii-the impact of the doctrine is not limited to administrative agency decisions and that the courts play a crucial role in promoting the public trust. Professor Joseph Sax had a vision of the public trust doctrine that would allow
citizens to "circumvent legislatures and administrative agencies" and "take their
concerns directly to the courts.""' By providing individuals with access to the
court in order to challenge decisions pertaining to trust resources-and by applying a heightened standard of review to those decisions-the Four Great Waters case serves as a blueprint for public trust litigants in all jurisdictions.
A. THE IMPORTANCE OFJUDICIAL REVIEW IN PROTECTING AN
IRREPLACEABLE TRUST RES

The Four Great Waters court found that jurisdiction was appropriate, noting that judicial review in the public trust context "provides a level of protec-

U.S. 519, 529 (1896). As Professor Echeverria notes, Geeris one of the Court's "most comprehensive exposition on the public ownership doctrine," and although the decision was later overruled, "the court's articulation in Geer of the public ownership doctrine still controls. John D.
Echeverria & Julie Lurman, "PerfectlyAstounding" Public Right Wdle Protection and the
Takings Clause, 16 TUL ENVTL. LJ. 331, 340 (2003). "Every state apparently continues to
subscribe to Geeis definition of public sovereign rights in wildlife." Id.
218. Mark Dowie, In Law We Trust Can environmental legislation still protect the commons?, ORION MAGAZINE, July/Aug. 2005 at 6, avadable at http://www.orionmagazine.org
/index.php/articles/article/122/.
219. Id.
220. Dave Owen, The Mono Lake Case, the Publc TrustDoctrine, and the Admnuistrative
State, 45 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 1099, 1104 (2012) ("In the post-1983 California freshwater cases
available on Lexis and Westlaw, no court has cited the public trust doctrine as a reason for
ordering anyone to do anything.").
221. Id. at 1108 (citing Joseph L. Sax, The Publc Trust Doctrinei2 NaturalResource Law:s
Effectivejudiciallntervention,68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 560 (1970)).
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tion against iniprovident dissipation of an irreplaceable res."' The term res
has its roots in Roman law and refers to a resource that by its nature cannot be
privately owned, but must be used in common.' Because the "beneficial interest in any res communes is held by the people in common," the government's authority to "divest the people of their common interest is limited by
the interests of the people.""' The concept of a public commons-the public
res-lies at the heart of the public trust doctrine. However, although this concept dates back to the Justinian Institute,' courts rarely discuss it in these
terms.
The court-by using phrases originally employed by the Arizona Supreme
Court and later adopted in Waiihole Ditch-advocates for a robust role for
the courts in the public trust context. In Arizona Centerfor Lawn the Public
Interest v. Hassell, the Arizona Court of Appeals explained that "[ludicial
review of public trust dispensations complements the concept of a public
trust."' The court described the role of the judiciary in light of the government's role as trustee, noting that:
the legislative and executive branches are judicially accountable for their dispositions of the public trust. The beneficiaries of the public trust are not just
present generations but those to come. The check and balance of judicial review provides a level of protection againstinprovident dissipationof an iTeplaceable res.m

Judicial recognition of the public res has a profound impact on public trust
litigation. Because these resources belong in part to future generations who
currently lack a voice in their disposition-and because they are inherently
finite and irreplaceable-they have a unique importance and delicacy that warrants heightened judicial review. In turn, this review will result in the enforcement and strengthening of public trust principles. The Four Great Waters
decision is an example of this continued development of the doctrine.
The court's emphasis on the importance of judicial review in the Four
Great Waters case suggests that several important principles apply to decisionmaking under the public trust.m It indicates, for example, that the judiciary
may play a more prominent role in reviewing state actions pertaining to trust
resources given that the public trust is both a statutory and constitutional guarantee. As a right granted under the State's constitution, "the ultimate authority
222. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d 129, 145 (Haw. 2012) (quoting Waihole Ditch, 9 P.3d
409, 455 (Haw. 2000)).
223. Gerald Torres, Who Owns the Sky?, 19 PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 515, 529 (2002). These
resources included, for example, "the air, the water which runs in the rivers, the sea, and its
shores ... landl wild animals." Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 525 (1896).
224. Torres, supra note 223, at 530.
225. Tuholske, supra note 3, at 214.
226. Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 168 (Aiiz. Ct. App.
1991).
227. Id. at 169 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
228. Note that this discussion is technically dicta because the court found a statutory and
constitutional due process basis for its jurisdiction. See supra Part II.A.2.
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to interpret and defend the public trust in Hawaii rests with the courts of this
state."' However, courts also play an important role in the application of the
Water Code, which requires "the check and balance of judicial review sufficient to protect against improvident dissipation of an irreplaceable res."' Accordingly, a decision that could offend the public trust if made incorrectly isin the words of the court-"too important to deprive parties of due process and
judicial review."" Given that many states have similarly adopted the public
trust language into their constitutions and state water codes,' the notion that
the public trust doctrine provides a dual means and an additional justification
for obtaining judicial review reaches far beyond Hawaii.
The Four Great Waters decision is consistent with what appears to be an
emerging trend in water law cases; providing citizens lacking traditional water
rights with a voice in decisions allocating water resources. For example, in
Montana Trout Unlimited v. Beaverhead Water Company, the Montana Supreme Court held that a conservation organization, Montana Trout Unlimited
("MTU"), had a sufficient "ownership interest" in the waters of the Big Hole
River Basin to require a hearing before the Water Court in a water adjudication despite the fact that the organization lacked any type of ownership of a
water right claim.' After the state Water Court issued a temporary preliminary
decree in the Basin, MTU objected to the water rights claims of the Beaverhead Water Company and requested a hearing.' Beaverhead argued in response that the organization lacked standing, asserting that "a claim for a water
right is the only method of establishing an 'ownership interest' in the use of
water."' The Water Court agreed, noting that although MTU's members had
environmental and recreational interests in the water, these interests were insufficient to establish standing absent an "ownership interest in water or its
use.""' According to the Water Court, only the state Department of Natural
Resources and Conservation or the Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks
were authorized to represent the public's interest."'
The Montana Supreme Court flatly rejected these arguments, concluding
that nothing in Montana's water adjudication statutes or its case law limits who
can file objections to a decree."' According to the court, the notion that the
only way to establish an ownership interest in the use of water is through a
claim for a water right is wholly inconsistent with the concept that water rights

229. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d 129, 145 (Haw. 2012) (quoting Waidhole Ditch, 9 P.3d
409, 455 (Haw. 2000)).
2 30. Id.
231. Id.
232. See generallyRobin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States' Pubhc
Trust Doctries: Publc Values, 1ivate Rihts, and the Evolution Toward an EcologicalPubhc
Trust supra note 2, at 53 (surveying the public trust doctrine as it applies in different states).
233. Mont. Trout Unlimited v. Beaverhead Water Co., 255 P.3d 179, 184 (Mont. 2011).
234. Id.at 180.
235. Id.at 180, 185.
236. Id.at 181-82.
237. Id.at 182.
238. Id.at 183.
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are solely usufructory, and convey no "actual physical ownership."' The court
found that MTU had standing based upon its environmental and recreational
interests in the water, which it held were sufficient to establish an ownership
interest based upon the public trust." Accordingly, the court held that the water court must hold a hearing on MTU's objections."
Like the decision in Montana Trout Unlimited, the Four Great Waters
decision represents a departure from the traditional notion of a water rights
dispute involving a conflict between two water rights holders. In both cases, the
courts rejected jurisdictional challenges and allowed individuals and organizations to participate in a hearing without filing a water right claim or applying for
a permit to use water."' Accordingly, these decisions do away with the notion
that standing to enforce the public trust requires a property interest that can
only be established through a claimed water right, and support a broader notion of the public trust doctrine based on non-traditional rights in water. An
expanded notion of standing is critical for water allocation decisions in the
Twenty-First Century, as ever-increasing demands for water clash with increasing demands for broad public uses. Especially in areas of the country where
climate change will diminish water resources," an expanded view of jurisdiction is vital for ensuring that allocation decisions reflect our common ownership of water. This is an impossible task under a system that allows only those
who claim water "rights" to participate in these decision-making processes.
B. A HEIGHTENED STANDARD OF REVIEW GOVERNING THE STATE
WATER RESOURCES TRUST

The court in the Four Great Rivers case also indicates its willingness to
serve as a check on the Commission and look more closely at the Commission's decisions to ensure compliance with public trust principles. Wai-ihole
Ditch established that the public trust doctrine imposes a "higher level of scrutiny" on Commission decisions favoring private uses because "the public trust,
by nature and definition, establishes use consistent with trust purposes as the
norm or 'default' condition."' According to the court in that case:
the constitutional requirements of "protection" and "conservation," the historical and continuing understanding of the trust as a guarantee of public
239. Id. at 185.
240. Id. at 185-86. The court found that these interests were distinct from the general public's and could be adversely affected by a decree. Id. at 185. Accordingly, the court stated:
based upon the State's ownership of the waters of Montana which it holds in public trust for the
benefit of its people, and the undisputed specific interests of the members of MTU in the Big
Hole River basin that MTU-under the facts of this case-has a sufficient ownership interest in
water or its use to demonstrate "good cause" to require the Water Court to hold a hearing or
hearings on its objections under [Montana state law]. Id. at 186.
241. Id. at 186.
242. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d 129, 145 (Haw. 2012); Id. at 185-86.
243. See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Climate Change and the Hegemony ofState Water Law, 29
STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 1, 10-14 (2010) (discussing the impacts of climate change on water resources,
both in the United States and globally).
244. Wazihole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 454 (Haw. 2000).
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rights, and the common reality of the "zero-sum" game between competing
water uses demand that any balancing between public and private purposes
begin with a presumption in favor of public use, access, and enjoyment.'"
Since its landmark Waidhole Ditch decision, the Hawaii Supreme Court has
further addressed the heightened standard of review governing the water resources trust on several occasions. For example, in the case Wadhole II the
court noted that, "because water is a public trust resource and the public trust
is a state constitutional doctrine, this court recognizes certain qualifications to
the standard of review regarding the Water Commission's decisions," which
compromise public rights in water."" Similarly, in In re Wai'ola 0 Moloka ,
Inc., the court distinguished the traditional standard of review governing decisions of the Commission from review of the Commission's decisions pertaining to the state water resources trust; again, the court noted that the "special
public interests in trust resources" mandates a heightened standard of review."'
The Four GreatRivers decision builds upon this line of cases, articulating
the precise standard of review the public trust requires. For example, given
that both the Water Code and the court's prior decision "have affirmed the
Commission's duty to establish IIFS that 'protect instream values to the extent
practicable' and 'protect the public interest,'"'" the court states a decision by
the Commission will satisfy the "close look review governing public trust resources" only where it "evinces 'a level of openness, diligence, and foresight
commensurate with the high priority these rights command under the laws of
our state."" By employing the "closer look" language in combination with its
description of the Commission's duty under the public trust, the court not
only clarifies the Commission's duty to protect the public's interest but emphasizes its own role in advancing public trust principles and affirms that the
judiciary will impose a more searching standard when dealing with trust resources.
The Four Great Water court's application of this searching standard to the
Commission's decision demonstrates that the public trust is more than an abstract principle the courts occasionally give lip service. Rather, it provides the
judiciary with broad authority to mandate concrete, substantive results and
grants them wide latitude in fashioning outcomes that adequately protect the
State's trust resources. The Four Great Waters decision envisions a public
trust doctrine that not only permits, but encourages, the State to take whatever
actions are necessary to protect trust resources-from amending instream
245. Id.
246. Waahole I 93 P.3d 643, 650 (Haw. 2004) (citing WaiaholeDitch, 9 P.3d at 455).
247. In re Wai'ola 0 Moloka'i, Inc., 83 P.3d 664, 684 (Haw. 2004) (holding that the Commission failed to discharge its duty under the public trust when it granted a water permit authorizing the construction and installation of a well); see also Alexandra B. Klass, Modem Public
Tust Principles:Recognizing Rights and Integratzng Standard, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699,
731 (2006) ("IThe Moloka'i courtl broadened its base of authority with regard to natural resources within the state in order to provide the maximum protection for such resources.").
248. Four Great Waters, 287 P.3d 129, 154 (Haw. 2012) (citing HAw. REV. STAT. § 174C71 (2)(A); Waidhole 11 93 P.3d at 653).
249. Id. (citing Wai'ola 0 Moloka'i, Inc., 83 P.3d at 685).
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standards to ordering a diverting party to take costly measures to minimize
system losses or find alternative sources-even if such actions may reduce established water rights.'
CONCLUSION
The Hawaii Supreme Court's recent decision in the Four Great Waters
case is an important expansion of the public trust doctrine. Perhaps most importantly, it builds upon the court's landmark ruling in Waiehole Ditch by
envisioning a broader role for both members of the public and the courts in
protecting against "improvident dissipation of an irreplaceable res." Because
judicial review of decisions impacting public trust resources directly furthers
the doctrine's overarching purpose of protecting public rights in water, other
jurisdictions should adopt a similar approach. For now, the Four Great Waters decision demonstrates that Hawaii will continue to pave the way in advancing public trust principles and serve as a model for other states seeking to do
the same.

250. Therefore, the decision does more than merely define the geographic boundaries of the
trust or the types of purposes protected by the trust. Cf Waidhole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 445-48
(outlining the "scope" and "substance" of the trust).

